JEWISH ETHICS AND THE ASERET HADIBROT

****The following is a summary of one portion of a lecture presented
to the Rabbinical Council of America by Rabbi Yosef Ber Soloveitchik
on June 22, 1972.****

The Ten Commandments are introduced in the book of Exodus by the words:

"Vayedaber Elokim et kol hadvarim ha'eleh *laimor*" (Shmot 20:1)
"And Elokim spoke all these words *saying*"

Use of the word "laimor" generally means "to be repeated". For example
the ubiquitous biblical phrase "Vayedaber Hashem el Moshe laimor"
indicates that Hashem's words to Moshe were subsequently to be
repeated by Moshe to B'nai Yisrael.  Yet, on the basis of this
explanation, use of the word "laimor" would seem puzzling in the
context of the Ten Commandments, since Moshe was not in this case an
intermediary: the Ten Commandments were given directly by Hashem to
B'nai Yisrael. Faced with this anomaly, the Mechilta implies that in
this context "laimor" means verbal acceptance by the entire nation
(1).

The precise nature of this communal response is the subject of a
dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva as quoted in the
Mechilta on the above verse (2):

"Laimor: 'Melamdim shehayu omrim al hen hen v'al lav lav' - divrei
Rabbi Yishmael Rabbi Akiva omer: 'al hen hen v'al lav hen'"

Rabbi Yishmael was of the view that B'nai Yisrael responded to each
positive commandment with a positive affirmation ("yea"), and
responded to each negative commandment with a "nay". For example:

Anochi Hashem Elokecha (I am the L-rd your G-d) ---'hen' ("yea") Lo
Tignov (You shall not steal) ---'lav' ("no")

Rabbi Akiva, however, disagreed. He said that just as the positive
commandments were received by a "yea", so too the negative
commandments. For example:

Anochi Hashem Elokecha---'hen' Lo Tignov---'hen'

Two great rabbis have disagreed. What is the gist of this controversy,
a disagreement which at first glance would seem trivial?

To render the dispute understandable, the Rav used the following
example. If he were to address himself to his grandson and say:
"Moshe, don't associate with Johnny, he's a bad boy", his grandson's
assent might be expressed in one of two ways. He could answer: "No,
Zaidy, I shall not play with him" or "Yes, Zaidy, I shall not play
with him". The difference between these two answers is one of
motivation. If his response is "No Zaidy, I shall not play with him",
Moshe means to say that he agrees with his grandfather's assessment of
Johnny. He has no intention of playing with him because, indeed,
Johnny is a bad boy.  However, the affirmative response means "I
accept your judgment even though I disagree with you: I myself do not
see any harm in fraternizing with Johnny, but your order will be
carried out".

What motivation should prompt one's Mitzvah performance? Should the
motivation be solely obedience, i.e. acting in accordance with the law
because one experiences normative pressure under the impact of G-d's
word? Or should the motivation be existential: i.e. one performs
Mitzvot because due to training, discipline, education, and the unique
bent in one's mentality, one develops an inner urge to act in harmony
with the moral and religious norm. In such a case, it is not the
impact of the imperative that motivates, but rather the inner need,
the urge, the drive, the yearning. Mitzvah performance is the ambition
and the quest in which one finds fulfillment and self realization.

To amplify this latter concept, the Rav provided the following
personal example:

"When I fast on Yom Kippur, I am completely unaware of the precept and
commandment "te'aneh es nefshoseichem" [the obligation to fast]. I say
it in tefilat zaka, but I'm not conscious of it the whole day.  I do
it [fast] not because of normative pressure or imperativistic
coercion. I simply love it: I find delight, joy and happiness in
cleansing myself, in being close to the Ribono Shel Olam. I would be
the most miserable, the most unhappy person in the world if the great
privilege of "teaneh es nafshseichem", of offering the small
sacrifice, be denied to me. And, you know, people have many phobias.
As I get older, I have an inner fright that chas veshalom [G-d
forbid], I will be forced to break the taanis [fast] because of
reasons of health. Such a traumatic experience would be rachmana
litzlan [G-d forbid], as far as I'm concerned, tragic, even fatal.  I
pray to G-d that it will never happen."

The philosophical question, however, remains: should performance of a
mitzvah result from an extraneous norm imposed upon finite man by the
infinite inscrutable will of G-d, or should this performance result
from an inner urge whose realization enhances life and exalts the
personality? This dichotomy is central to understanding the issue of
"metzuveh ve'oseh"(3) , whether reward is greater for one who performs
a mitzvah as a result of an imperative as opposed to mitzvah
performance resulting from personal initiative.

Rabbi Yishmael's Opinion: "Al lav lav"

Most of our sages distinguished between chukim and mishpatim. They
declared the compliance with chukim to be a gesture of pure obedience
and subordination to G-d.  Conversely, adherence to mishpatim is a
result of an inner moral need that G-d implanted in man when the
latter was created in His image. The mere fact that man carries G-d's
image within himself suggests that morality is characteristic of human
nature, and that doing good is an indispensible necessity no less than
food or air.

This understanding of the dichtomy between chukim and mishpatim forms
the basis for the opinion of Maimonides, who states in unequivocal
terms (4), that one is not allowed to say "Ee Efshi bebasar chazir",
"I don't eat pork because I don't like the taste of it", but should
rather say: "I would rather enjoy eating pork, but it is forbidden".
The act of abstention is due to obedience, surrender and to normative
pressure. In contrast, with regard to mishpatim a similar statement
would seem absurd. Could one possibly maintain: "I would like to
commit murder, but I abstain because the Torah forbade it" ? One
complies with chukim out of obedience, complete surrender and
subordination to the divine word. Conversely, Hashem also expects man
to act with dignity and to reject sin, injustice and cruelty because
they are abominable and repugnant to man. This rejection must of
course comply with the rule of Hashem, but the motivating criterion
should be human dignity, and there is therefore no need for external
normative pressure.

This distinction is the reason why blessings are recited for mitzvot
"bein adam lamakom" (between man and G-d) and not "bein adam
lechaveiro" (between man and man). The purpose of the blessing is to
emphasize our actions in deference and submission to the Divine Will.
The key phrase in the blessing is asher kidshanu bemitzvotov
*vetzivanu*. The motivation for performing the mitzvah for which a
blessing is recited is the divine imperative (5).

If left to ourselves, we could not conceive mitzvot such as shofar,
lulav, succa, or tefilin, for their rationale is unknown to us. Human
reason cannot grasp their purpose, central motif or objective. In
contrast, mitzvot "bein adam lechaveiro", which are subsumed under
mishpatim, contain an easily understood rationale and therefore their
implementation is motivated not by normative coercion but by the
existential need of lonely man created in the image of Infinity to do
mitzvot. By practicing morality, man feels that he will come nearer to
his creator. Since the mitzvah performance is spontaneous and not
coerced, we do not offer a blessing.

This basic premise forms the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael "she'omrim al
hen hen v'al lav lav ". "Al lav lav" means that in response to the
command, 'Thou shalt not murder' the people respond -- "no: on our own
we reject murder, for we hate to extinguish life". To 'Thou shalt not
steal' the people respond --"no, we ourselves reject embezzlement and
thievery". 'Thou shalt not commit adultery' --"no, on our own we
reject sexual promiscuity". 'Thou shalt not bear false witness'-- "no,
on our own we understand how abominable perjury is". 'Thou shalt not
covet'-- "no, on our own we understand how reprehensible coveting is".

Rabbi Akiva's Opinion: "Al lav hen"

Rabbi Akiva, however, approached this issue differently. He maintained
that B'nei Yisrael's response was yes to all pronouncements, including
the negative ones. In other words, they said 'yes' to all the
commandments. In other words, their response was, "we surrender to
Your will, we accept the norm, we shall comply with it". Rabbi Akiva
apparently insisted upon normative motivation for mishpatim as well as
chukim. Even though the negative precepts are acceptable to and
sanctioned by any civilized society, they still require commitment and
surrender to G-d.

The Rav indicated that if in this dispute the choice were his, he
would be guided by the rule: "Halacha keRebbe Akiva", and would accept
Akiva's interpretation.  Surrender and obedience are most necessary,
not only for chukim but for mishpatim as well.  Rabbi Akiva's opinion
is based on the fact that a clearly defined distinction between chukim
and mishpatim is practically nonexistent. The central conception of
mishpatim is illumined by a rationale, can be developed by human
reason, and is therefore accessible to the logos.  However, one's
conscience is sensitive to the mishpatim only as far as the central
area of mishpatim is concerned. The peripheral territories are as
strange and alien to reason as the most mysterious chukim. Along the
periphery, the cultivated, friendly and attractive scenery of
mishpatim suddenly turns into a dark jungle.

As an example of a mishpat's "periphery", the Rav discussed the law
against theft. Every sensitive individual would confirm and abide by
such a law. The thief is held in contempt: the embezzler despised by
society. The rationale is simple and self-evident.  Only a psychopath
would approve of stealing candy from a child or money from the box of
a blind beggar.

Yet, what about the sort of theft depicted so often in literature,
particularly by Victor Hugo, in Les Miserables. A poor man just
released from prison with no prospects of earning money steals a loaf
of bread from a bakery to sustain his life. The proprietor of the
bakery wishes to prosecute even though the loss incurred is very
small. Is the poor starving man deserving of punishment? Has a crime
been committed or not? If human conscience is the authority judging
the validity of the mishpat, then we could conclude that there was no
transgression, that the action of stealing the loaf of bread was
justifiable and quite possibly heroic.

There is only a single response to this dilemma: stealing is forbidden
by the Almighty, and at Sinai we gave our assent, the hen. We will
abide by Your will, whether we understand or not.

A similar example cited by the Rav was in regard to the sin of murder.
Man, no matter what persuasion, faith or ideology indignantly condemns
the murderer and the act of murder.  Yet, what about a situation which
Dostoevsky portrayed so vividly in Crime and Punishment? The book
depicts a cruel, miserly old woman who is a loan shark sucking the
blood of those unfortunates caught in her web; a person who evicts the
old and frail on a winter day in below zero temperatures. In sharp
contrast, also depicted is a brilliant young student who cannot afford
to continue his medical studies and who hopelessly watches his sister
being sold into white slavery and exiled to some oriental country. A
loan of a few hundred rubles could have remedied his problems, yet the
old women refused to lend him the money.  In a moment of despair the
student kills the miser. Do we have the right to condemn the student?
Should we consider such a murder a crime? Again the answer is Rabbi
Akiva's 'hen'; the Almighty has forbidden murder, whatever the motive.

If the sinfulness of murder were solely a result of human moral
judgement, then why not permit abortion? According to Jewish Law,
abortion is murder. The fertilized ovum, particularly after 40-50 days
is a living organism: potentially it has all talents and capabilities
of the human being. If human conscience is the judge, inconvenience to
the mother would take precedence over the extinction of life. However
if the Almighty is the judge, if the response to 'Thou shalt not
murder' is "yea", not "nay", then abortion truly is morally equivalent
to murder. If the human psyche does not find the killing of an unborn
child repugnant, if murder is permitted based solely on moral
resaonableness and sensitivity, then why not allow euthanasia?
Furthermore, if the prohibition against murder is only nurtured by our
sensitivity, then a doctor may kill an older person for the sake of
obtaining a heart to transplant to a younger person. A doctor in
England has gone so far as to express the opinion that hospitals
should withhold resources in treating those above the age of 70, since
these old people will soon die in any case.

Rabbi Akiva therefore maintained that morality must not rely solely on
man's cognitive abilities, even in regard to mishpatim, since certain
domains are inaccesible to human moral exploration and illumination.
Yet, the entire structure of morality would collapse should society
actually permit their violation.

Chukotai Ve'et Mishpatai

"Ushmartem atem et chukotai v'et mishpatai v'lo taasu kechol hatoevot
ha'eleh" (Vayikra 18:26)

"And you shall observe my chukim and my mishpatim, and you shall not
do all these abominations".

In order to meticulously observe the mishpatim which form the very
foundation upon which civilized society rests, and to avoid the
abominations accepted and practiced by the Canaanites, the community
must be trained to observe the chukim as well.  "Ushmartem et
chukotai", and then "ve'et mishpatai". In this way alone can one
guarantee: "v'lo ta'asu kechol hatoavot ha'eleh". One must teach the
people how to surrender their intellectual pride and arrogance, and
commit themselves to the Almighty, even though man's reason is unable
to comprehend the moral necessity and practical utility of the chok.
Secular ethics have failed because the element of chok is not
comprehensible to secular man. If the integrity of the moral law is to
be preserved, then one must accept the chukim, to abstain from the act
which holds great promise and conversely, to act in ways which
sometimes seem illogical and even painful: 'al hen hen v'al lav hen'.

Organized by  Dr. A. Lustiger
________
I would like to thank Henry Lerner and Rabbi Dov Green for  their careful 
review of this article.

FOOTNOTES

1) [Editor's note: See Vayikra 10:16, where Moshe reproaches Aharon 's
sons for not eating the chatat offering after the Nadav-Avihu
incident. The verse ends with the words: "...vayikzof al Elazar v'al
Itamar b'nei Aharon hanotarim *laimor*". The word "laimor", according
to Rashi, signifies that Moshe had demanded a response to his words.]
2) Rashi's commentary on the above verse only quotes Rabbi Yishmael's
opinion 
3) Baba Kama 38a, Kiddushin 31a 
4) Rambam's introduction to Pirkei Avot ("Shmoneh Prakim")- chapter 6 
5) Although according to Rabbeinu Tam (Tosfot on Kiddushin 38b, d'h
d'lo), women may pronounce a blessing on "mitzvot aseh shehazman
grama" despite the optional nature of such mitzvah performance by
women, the Rambam (Hilchot Tzitzit 3:9) in fact holds that women do
not pronounce such a blessing, because the normative element is
absent. The blessing is inseparably related to the imperative, not to
the act per se.  The accent is on the word "vetzivanu".

Please send any comments/corrections/opinions to:

Arnie Lustiger
alustig@erenj.com